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The generation of random numbers is a task of paramount importance in modern science. A
central problem for both classical and quantum randomness generation is to estimate the entropy of
the data generated by a given device. Here we present a protocol for self-testing quantum random
number generation, in which the user can monitor the entropy in real-time. Based on a few general
assumptions, our protocol guarantees continuous generation of high quality randomness, without
the need for a detailed characterization of the devices. Using a fully optical setup, we implement
our protocol and illustrate its self-testing capacity. Our work thus provides a practical approach to
quantum randomness generation in a scenario of trusted but error-prone devices.
Given the importance of randomness in modern sci-
ence and beyond, e.g. for simulation algorithms and for
cryptography, an intense research effort has been devoted
to the problem of extracting randomness from quantum
systems. Devices for quantum random number genera-
tion (QRNG) are now commercially available. All these
schemes work essentially according to the same principle,
exploiting the randomness of quantum measurements. A
simple realization consists in sending a single photon on
a 50/50 beam-splitter and detecting the output path [1–
3]. Other designs were developed, based on measuring
the arrival time of single photons [4–7], the phase noise
of a laser [8–10], vacuum fluctuations [11, 12], and even
mobile phone cameras [13].
A central issue in randomness generation is the prob-
lem of estimating the entropy of the bits that are gen-
erated by a device, i.e. how random is the raw output
data. When a good estimate is available, appropriate
post-processing can be applied to extract true random
bits from the raw data (via a classical procedure termed
randomness extractor [14]). However, poor entropy esti-
mation is one of the main weaknesses of classical RNG
[15], and can have important consequences. In the con-
text of QRNG, entropy estimates for specific setups were
recently provided using sophisticated theoretical models
[16, 17]. Nevertheless, this approach has several draw-
backs. First, these techniques are relatively cumbersome,
requiring estimates for numerous experimental parame-
ters which may be difficult to precisely assess in prac-
tice. Second, each study applies to a specific experimen-
tal setup, and cannot be used for other implementations.
Finally, it offers no real-time monitoring of the quality
of the RNG process, hence no protection against unno-
ticed misalignment (or even failures) of the experimental
setup.
It is therefore highly desirable to design QRNG tech-
niques which can provide a real-time estimate of the out-
put entropy. An elegant solution is provided by the con-
cept of device-independent QRNG [18, 19], where ran-
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domness can be certified and quantified without relying
on a detailed knowledge of the functioning of the de-
vices used in the protocol. Nevertheless, the practical
implementation of such protocols is extremely challeng-
ing as it requires the genuine violation of Bell’s inequality
[19, 20]. Alternative approaches were proposed [21] but
their experimental implementation suffers from loopholes
[22]. More recently, an approach based on the uncer-
tainty principle was proposed but requires a fully char-
acterized measurement device [23].
Here, we present a simple and practical protocol for
self-testing QRNG. Based on a prepare-and-measure
setup, our protocol provides a continuous estimate of
the output entropy. Our approach requires only a few
general assumptions about the devices (such as quantum
systems of bounded dimension) without relying on a de-
tailed model of their functioning. This setting is relevant
to real-world implementations of randomness generation,
and is well-adapted to a scenario of trusted but error-
prone providers, i.e. a setting where the devices used in
the protocol are not actively designed to fool the user,
but where implementation may be imperfect. The key
idea behind our protocol is to certify randomness from a
pair of incompatible quantum measurements. As the in-
compatibility of the measurements can be directly quan-
tified from experimental data, our protocol is self-testing.
That is, the amount genuine quantum randomness can
be quantified directly from the data, and can be sepa-
rated from other sources of randomness such as fluctu-
ations due to technical imperfections. We implemented
this scheme with standard technology, using a single pho-
ton source and fibered telecommunication components.
We implement the complete QRNG protocol, achieving
a rate 23 certified random bits per second, with 99% con-
fidence.
Protocol. Our protocol, sketched in Fig. 1, uses two de-
vices which respectively prepare and measure an unchar-
acterized qubit system. In each round of the protocol,
the observer chooses settings among four possible prepa-
rations, x = 0, 1, 2, 3, and two measurements y = 0, 1,
resulting in a binary outcome b = ±1. To model imper-
fections, we represent the internal state of each device by
ar
X
iv
:1
41
0.
27
90
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
8 J
an
 20
16
2FIG. 1. Sketch of the protocol. The self-testing QRNG
protocol consists in 3 distinct steps. (1) First, an experi-
ment is performed where, in each round, the user chooses a
preparation x and a measurement y, and obtains an outcome
b. (2) From the raw data, the distribution p(b|x, y) can be
estimated leading to an estimate for the value of the witness
W , from which the entropy of the raw data can be quantified.
(3) Based on the entropy bound, appropriate post-processing
of the raw data is performed, in order to extract the final
random bit string.
a random variable—λ for the preparation device and µ
for the measurement device—which are unknown to the
observer. As we work in a scenario where the devices are
not maliciously conspiring against the user, we assume
the devices to be independent, i.e. p(λ, µ) = q(λ)r(µ),
where
∫
dλq(λ) =
∫
dµr(µ) = 1.
In each round of the experiment, the preparation de-
vice emits a qubit state ρλx which depends on the setting
x and on the internal state λ. Similarly, the measure-
ment device performs a measurement Mµy . Thus the dis-
tributions of λ and µ determine the distributions of the
prepared states and the measurements. As the observer
has no access to the variables λ and µ, he will observe
1p(b|x, y) =
∫
dλq(λ)
∫
dµ r(µ)p(b|x, y, λ, µ)
= Tr(ρx
1 + bMy
2
) =
1
2
(
1 + b~Sx · ~Ty
)
(1)
where
ρx =
∫
dλq(λ)ρλx =
1
2
(
1 + ~Sx · ~σ
)
(2)
My =
∫
dµr(µ)Mµy = ~Ty · ~σ. (3)
Here, ~Sx and ~Ty denote the Bloch vectors of the (aver-
age) states and measurements, and ~σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) is the
vector of Pauli matrices.
The task of the observer is to estimate the amount
of genuine quantum randomness generated in this setup,
based only on the observed distribution p(b|x, y). This is
a nontrivial task as the apparent randomness of the dis-
tribution (0 < p(b|x, y) < 1) can have different origins.
On the one hand, it could be genuine quantum random-
ness. That is, if in a given round of the experiment, the
state ρλx is not an eigenstate of the measurement operator
Mµy , then the outcome b cannot be predicted with cer-
tainty, even if the internal states λ and µ are known, i.e.
0 < p(b|x, y, λ, µ) < 1. On the other hand, the appar-
ent randomness may be due to technical imperfections,
that is, to fluctuations of the internal states λ and µ.
Consider the following example: The preparation device
emits the states ρλ=0x = |0〉〈0| and ρλ=1x = |1〉〈1| with
q(λ = 0, 1) = 1/2. For a measurement of the observable
My = zˆ · ~σ, one obtains that p(b|x, y) = 1/2. However,
this data clearly contains no quantum randomness, since
the outcome b can be perfectly guessed if the internal
state λ is known.
Our protocol allows the observer to separate quantum
randomness from the randomness due to technical noise.
The key technical tool of our protocol is a function re-
cently presented in [24], which works as a ’dimension wit-
ness’. Given data p(b|x, y), the quantity
W =
∣∣∣∣p(1|0, 0)− p(1|1, 0) p(1|2, 0)− p(1|3, 0)p(1|0, 1)− p(1|1, 1) p(1|2, 1)− p(1|3, 1)
∣∣∣∣ . (4)
captures the quantumness of the preparation and mea-
surements. Specifically, if the preparations are classical
(i.e. there exist a basis in which all states ρλx are diago-
nal), one has that W = 0, while a generic qubit strategy
achieves 0 ≤ W ≤ 1 [24]. W > 0 guarantees that the
measurements performed by Bob are incompatible (see
[25]) and since it is then impossible to simultaneously as-
sign deterministic outcomes to them, this enables us to
bound the guessing probability and certify randomness.
Given x, y, and knowledge of the internal states λ, µ, the
best guess for b is given by maxb p(b|x, y, λ, µ). Assuming
uniformly distributed x and y, the average probability of
guessing b fulfils the following inequality (see [25])
pguess =
1
8
∑
x,y,λ,µ
qλrµ max
b
p(b|x, y, λ, µ)
≤ 1
2
(
1 +
√
1 +
√
1−W 2
2
)
. (5)
Therefore the guessing probability can be upper-bounded
by a function of W , which can be determined directly
from the data p(b|x, y). Finally, to extract random bits
from the raw data, we use a randomness extraction pro-
cedure. The number of random bits that can be ex-
tracted per experimental run is given by the min-entropy
Hmin = − log2 pguess [26]. Hence Hmin is the relevant pa-
rameter for determining how the raw data must be post-
processed. Note that randomness can be extracted for
any W > 0, since pguess < 1 in this case.
The maximal value of W = 1 can be reached using
the set of preparations and measurements: ~S0 = −~S1 =
~T0 = zˆ and ~S2 = −~S3 = ~T1 = xˆ, which correspond to
the BB84 QKD protocol [27]. In this case, we can cer-
tify randomness with min-entropy Hmin ' 0.2284. Using
other preparations and measurements, e.g. if the system
is noisy or becomes misaligned, one will typically obtain
0 < W < 1. Nevertheless, for any value W > 0, random-
ness can be certified, and the corresponding min-entropy
can be estimated using equation (5). Our protocol is
3therefore self-testing, since the evaluation of W allows
quantifying the amount of randomness in the data. In
turn, this allows one to perform adapted post-processing
in order to finally extract random bits.
To conclude this section, we discuss the assumptions
which are required in our protocol:
(i) Choice and distribution of settings. The devices
make no use of any prior information about the
choice of settings x and y.
(ii) Internal states of the devices are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d). The distributions
q(λ) and r(µ) do not vary between experimental
rounds.
(iii) Independent devices. The preparation and mea-
surement devices are independent, in the sense that
p(λ, µ) = q(λ)r(µ).
(iv) Qubit channel capacity. The information about the
choice of preparation x retrieved by the measure-
ment device (via a measurement on the mediating
particle) is contained in a 2-dimensional quantum
subspace (a qubit).
Assumptions (i) and (iii) are arguably rather natural
in a setting where the devices are produced without ma-
licious intent. They concern the independence of devices
used in the protocol, namely the preparation and mea-
surement devices, and the choice of settings. When these
are produced by trusted (or simply different) providers,
it is reasonable to assume that there are no (built-in) pre-
established correlations between the devices and that the
settings x, y can be generated independently, e.g. using a
pseudo-RNG. Assumptions (ii) and (iv) are stronger, and
will have to be justified for the particular implementation
at hand. The content of assumption (ii) is essentially
that the devices are memoryless (internal states do not
depend on previous events). We believe this assumption
can likely be weakened, since randomness can in fact be
guaranteed in the presence of certain memory effects, in
particular the experimentally relevant afterpulsing effect
(see [25]). Finally, note that assumption (iv) restricts the
amount of information about x that is retrieved by the
measuring device (via a measurement on the mediating
particle), but not the information about x contained in
the mediating particle itself. In other words, it might
be the case that information about x leaks out from the
preparation device via side-channels, but we assume that
these side-channels are not maliciously exploited by the
measurement device.
Experiment. We implemented the above protocol us-
ing a fully-guided optical setup (see Fig. 2 (a)). The
qubit preparations are encoded in the polarization state
of single photons, generated via a heralded single-photon
source based on a continuous wave spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion process in a periodically poled
lithium niobate (PPLN) waveguide [28]. The idler pho-
ton is detected with a ID220 free-running InGaAs/InP
single-photon detector (SPD) (herald) with 20% detec-
tion efficiency and 20 µs dead time. The polarization
is rotated using a polarization controller (PC) and an
electro-optical birefringence modulator (BM) based on a
lithium niobate waveguide phase modulator. The prepa-
rations x = {0, 1, 2, 3} correspond respectively to the di-
agonal (D), anti-diagonal (A), circular right (R) and cir-
cular left (L) polarization states. For the measurement
device, polarization measurements are done using a BM
and a PC followed by a polarization beam splitter (PBS)
and two ID210 InGaAs/InP SPDs (with a 1.5 ns gate and
25% detection efficiency) triggered by a detection at the
heralding detector. The measurements y = {0, 1} corre-
spond respectively to the {D,A} basis and the {R,L} ba-
sis. The number of photon pairs generated by the SPDC
source is set to obtain a count rate at the heralding detec-
tor of about 30 kHz, which corresponds to a probability
of single photon emission of p1 = 6.5 × 10−4 per gate,
and a two photon emission p2 = p
2
1/2 = 2.1 × 10−7 per
gate. A Field-Programmable-Gate-Array board (FPGA)
continuously generates sequences of 3 pseudo-random
bits. Upon successful heralding, these 3 bits are used
to choose (x, y). Finally, the FPGA records the outcome
b (whether each ID210 detector has clicked or not).
We briefly discuss to which extent the assumptions
of the protocol fit to our implementation. First, the
choice of preparation and measurement, x and y, are
made by the FPGA using a linear-feedback shift register
pseudo-RNG [29]. This RNG provides a deterministic
cyclic function sampled by the heralding detector. Since
the sampling is asynchronous with respect to the RNG
rate, the output is uniform and (i) is fulfilled. The BMs
are separated spatially by 1 m, their temperature is con-
trolled independently, and the voltages are applied with
independent electronic circuits. Any cross-talk between
them, e.g. due to stray electric fields, can be safely ne-
glected, hence (iii) is also fulfilled. Concerning assump-
tion (ii), we evaluate the distribution p(b|x, y) after ev-
ery minute of acquisition. Therefore, we need to consider
memory effects with time characteristics shorter than 1
minute. Two main effects should be considered: charge
accumulation in the birifringence modulator, and after-
pulsing in the detectors, which is a common issue in stan-
dard QRNG approaches [4, 16]. Importantly, our proto-
col is robust to afterpulsing, (see [25]). Charge effects
in the modulator are relevant only for modulation slower
than 1 Hz [30]. Finally, the qubit assumption (iv) is
arguably the most delicate one. As the choice of prepa-
ration x is encoded in the polarization of a single photon,
(iv) seems justified. However, a small fraction of heralded
events corresponds to multi-photon pulses, in which (iv)
is not valid. To take these events into account, we extend
our theoretical analysis (see [25]). We show that quan-
tum randomness can still be guaranteed even when (iv) is
not fulfilled in all experimental events, provided that the
fraction of events violating (iv) can be bounded and is
small enough compared to the total number of successful
events. To verify this assumption, the probability of sin-
4FIG. 2. Implementing the self-testing QRNG. (a) Experimental setup. (b) Real-time evolution of the witness value W (blue)
and randomness generation rate (bits extracted per second; red). After 3 hours, the air conditioning in the laboratory is
switched off, which leads to misalignment of the optical components. In turn, this leads to a significant drop of the witness
value W and corresponding entropy.
gle and multi-photon pulses must be properly calibrated.
For our single-photon source, the ratio of multi-photon
events vs. heralds is given by ∼ p1/2 = 3.25× 10−4, and
our method can be applied.
We ran the experiment estimating W for the data ac-
cumulated each minute. As discussed in [25], the estima-
tion of W considers finite-size effects and the size of the
randomness extractor is determined based on the value
of W [16, 31]. In the best conditions, our setup gener-
ates about 402 bits/s of raw data (before the extractor).
The witness corresponds to a value of W = 0.76. Af-
ter extraction, we get final random bits at a rate of 23
bits/s with a confidence of 99%. Note that the confidence
level is set when accounting for finite size effects; a higher
confidence can be chosen at the expense of a lower rate.
Note also that this rate is limited by the slow repetition
rate of the experiment (limited by the dead time of the
heralding detector) and by the losses in the optical imple-
mentation (channel transmission is ∼ 8%; total efficiency
∼ 2%). Fig. 2(b) shows the estimated value of W over
3.5 hours and the rate at which the final random bits
are generated. To demonstrate the self-testing capacity
of our protocol, we switched off the air conditioning in
the room after 3 hours. This impacts the alignment of
the setup. As can be seen from Fig. 2(b), the witness
value W drops, reflecting the fact that the distributions
of internal states (q(λ) and r(µ)) changed. In turn, this
forces us to perform more post-processing, resulting in
a lower randomness generation rate. Nevertheless, the
quality of the final random bits is still guaranteed. This
shows that our setup can warrant the generation of high
quality randomness, without active stabilization or pre-
cise modelling of the impact of the temperature increase.
The quality of the generated randomness can be as-
sessed by checking for patterns and correlations in the
extracted bits. We performed standard statistical test, as
defined by NIST, and although not all tests could be per-
formed due to the small size of the sample, all performed
tests were successful (see [25]). We stress that these tests
do not constitute a proof of randomness (which is impos-
sible), however failure to pass any of them would indicate
the presence of correlations among the output bits.
Finally, we comment on the influence of losses. In the
above analysis, we discarded inconclusive events in which
the photon was not detected at the measuring device, al-
though the emission of a single-photon was heralded by
the source. Therefore, our analysis is subject to an ad-
ditional assumption, namely that of fair-sampling, which
we believe is rather natural in the case of non-malicious
devices. Note however that this is not necessary strictly
speaking, as our protocol is in principle robust to arbi-
trarily low detection efficiency [24]. Performing the data
analysis without the fair-sampling assumption (in which
case the inconclusive events are attributed the outcome
-1) we obtain witness values of W ∼ 1.5 × 10−4, corre-
sponding to Hmin ∼ 2.0×10−9. In this case, the rate for
generating random bits drops considerably to 6 × 10−5
bits/s, but importantly does not vanish. Hence, our setup
can be used to certify randomness without requiring the
fair-sampling assumption. We note that even a small in-
crease in efficiency would lead to a large improvement in
rate. E.g. an increase from our current 2% to 10% would
already give ∼ 0.04 bits/s while an overall efficiency of
50% would be enough to reach 23 bits/s without post-
selection, equal to our current post-selected rate.
Conclusion. We have presented a protocol for self-
testing QRNG, which allows for real-time monitoring of
the entropy of the raw data. This allows adapting the
randomness extraction procedure in order to continu-
ously generate high quality random bits. Using a fully
optical guided implementation, we have demonstrated
that our protocol is practical and efficient, and illustrated
its self-testing capacity. Our work thus provides an ap-
proach to QRNG, which can be viewed as intermediate
between the standard (device-dependent) approach and
the device-independent one.
Compared to the device-dependent approach, our pro-
tocol delivers a stronger form of security requiring less
characterization of the physical implementation, at the
price of a reduced rate compared to commercial QRNGs
such as ID Quantique QUANTIS which reaches 4Mbits/s.
A fully device-independent approach [18, 19], on the
5other hand, offers even stronger security (in particular as-
sumptions (ii)-(iv) can be relaxed, hence offering robust-
ness to side-channels and memory effects), but its prac-
tical implementation is extremely challenging. Proof-of-
principle experiments require state-of-the-art setups but
could achieve only very low rates [19, 20]. Our approach
arguably offers a weaker form of security, but can be im-
plemented with standard technology. Our work considers
a scenario of trusted but error-prone devices, which we
believe to be relevant in practice.
Note added After submission of this work, several re-
lated works have appeared [32–34].
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
In this Supplementary material we provide a proof of
randomness for our protocol along with the required as-
sumptions in Sec. A. We show that our protocol is robust
to detector afterpulsing in Sec. B. We show how to ac-
count for multi-photon events in Sec. C, and we account
for finite-size effects in Sec. D. Finally, we discuss statis-
tical tests applied to the output data.
Appendix A: Proof of randomness
Here we provide a lower bound on the randomness
in the observed output using the dimension witness of
Ref. [24]. The devices are assumed to be independent,
but each device features an internal source of random-
ness, represented by the variable λ for Alice, and variable
µ for Bob. Our goal is to upper bound the probability of
guessing the output b that one would have if λ and µ were
known, averaged over all inputs and values of the local
random variables. Before proceeding with the proof, we
first establish the setting in which we will work and state
the assumptions made.
1. Setting and assumptions
A priori, the probability of observing a certain output
in a given round of the experiment could depend on ev-
erything that happened before, and later events could be
correlated with the observation of a certain output. How-
ever, we will introduce several assumptions which ensure
that we can speak about output probabilities without re-
ferring to specific rounds as well as the independence of
the devices. Let us associate random variables Bi, Xi,
Yi, Λi, Mi with the output, the inputs, and the internal
variables in round i, and let us write ~Bi for the set of
variables B1, ..., Bi etc. Also, let us denote the probabil-
ities for the random variables to take on specific values
by lower case symbols, e.g. p(xi) = P (Xi = xi) and
p(~bi|~xi, ~yi) = P ( ~Bi = ~bi| ~Xi = ~xi, ~Yi = ~yi).
Our first assumption is that all inputs are independent
of each other and the devices. Formally, Xi is indepen-
dent of Xj for any j 6= i and of ~Yi−1, ~Λi−1, ~Mi−1, and
similarly for Yi. Our second assumption is that the out-
put in a given round depends only on the inputs in that
round and the current state of the devices. Formally, Bi is
conditionally independent of ~Bi−1, ~Xi−1, ~Yi−1, ~Λi−1, and
~Mi−1 given Xi, Yi, Λi, and Mi. Our third assumption is
that the devices do not record the outputs. Formally, Λi
and Mi are independent of ~Bi−1. Under these assump-
tions, the probability for a certain string of outputs to
occur factorises
p(~bn|~xn, ~yn, ~λn, ~µn) =
n∏
i=1
p(bi|xi, yi, λi, µi). (A1)
This can be seen by repeated application of Bayes’ rule.
The probability to correctly guess the output string ~bn
knowing all the inputs and internal variables in an ex-
periment with n rounds is
pg
~xn~yn~λn~µn
= max
~bn
p(~bn|~xn, ~yn, ~λn, ~µn)
=
n∏
i=1
max
b
p(b|xi, yi, λi, µi), (A2)
and it follows that
log(pg
~xn~yn~λn~µn
) =
n∑
i=1
log(max
b
p(b|xi, yi, λi, µi))
≤ n log( 1
n
n∑
i=1
max
b
p(b|xi, yi, λi, µi)).
(A3)
We now assume that the distribution of the internal ran-
domness is fixed for the duration of the experiment. For-
mally, the ~Λn are identically distributed, and the ~Mn as
well. With this assumption, for n → ∞ the sum in the
last line above is equivalent to averaging over the inputs
and internal variables, that is, it equals∑
x,y
∑
λ,µ
max
b
p(b|x, y, λ, µ)p(x, y)p(λ, µ). (A4)
With the final assumption that the devices are inde-
pendent, formally that the ~Λn are independent of the
~Mn, it follows from our proof below that this quantity
is bounded by a function of the observed witness value
f(W ). This implies that in the limit of large n
pg
~xn~yn~λn~µn
≤ f(W )n, (A5)
6and hence the entropy per bit in the output string is
bounded by
H = − 1
n
log2(p
g
~xn~yn~λn~µn
) ≥ − log2(f(W )). (A6)
We have assumed that the internal random variables
are identically distributed in every round. On the phys-
ical level, the corresponding requirement is that any ex-
ternal parameters which influence the distributions qλ,
rµ, such as e.g. temperature, vary slowly on the time-
scale of one experimental run, i.e. the time required to
gather enough data to estimate the witness value W . In
our experimental implementation this time-scale is about
one minute. Between different experimental runs there
is no requirement for qλ, rµ to stay unchanged. We have
also assumed that the internal variables are independent
of the outputs. Note however that we believe that these
assumptions can be relaxed. For example, detector after-
pulsing breaks the second assumption, but randomness
can nevertheless be certified in our protocol as demon-
strated in Sec. B.
2. Proof
Having established the above assumptions, we can now
go ahead with our randomness proof without reference to
any specific round of the experiment, i.e. we can work just
with the distribution p(b|x, y, λ, µ). For given inputs and
λ, µ, the guessing probability for this distribution is
pgxyλµ = max
b
p(b|x, y, λ, µ). (A7)
The average guessing probability pg is the average of
pgxyλµ over the distribution of inputs and local random-
ness. To proceed, however, we will first derive an upper
bound on pgλµ, defined to be the average over the inputs
only.
We consider the witness W of the main text. We thus
have four preparations, x = 0, 1, 2, 3 and two measure-
ments y = 0, 1. Consider choices of preparations and
measurements which are uniformly random (as explained
in the main text, pseudorandomness is sufficient here),
i.e. each combination x, y occurs with probability 1/8.
We have that
pgλµ =
1
8
∑
x,y
max
b
p(b|x, y, λ, µ)
≤ 1
2
max
x
∑
y
max
b
p(b|x, y, λ, µ)
≤ 1 + cos(θµ/2)
2
(A8)
where θµ denotes the angle between Bob’s two measure-
ment. The reasoning of the derivation is as follows. The
best guessing probability averaged over inputs of Alice
is bounded by the maximum over her inputs. This gives
FIG. 3. Cut through the Bloch sphere showing the measure-
ments of Bob, and a state |ψ〉 lying in the same plane. The
probabilities of outcome, say, b = 1 are given by the projec-
tions of |ψ〉 onto Tµ0,1. The probabilities when |ψ〉 makes an
angle φ with Tµ0 are indicated. To maximise the average of
these, one must choose φ = θµ/2. Note that choosing a state
out of the plane of the measurements can only decrease the
guessing probability.
the first inequality and allows us to focus on the best
possible state that Alice can send. Next, Bob has two
measurements described by Bloch vectors ~Tµ0,1, and θµ is
the angle between them. The best guessing probability
averaged over his inputs is obtained by sending a state
which lies in the middle between his measurements on
the Bloch sphere (see Fig. 3). For such a state, the out-
come probabilities for the two values of b are cos2(θµ/4),
and sin2(θµ/4). Choosing the larger value and using the
double-angle formula, one arrives at the second inequal-
ity.
Now we use the fact that a bound on the angle θµ can
be derived from the witness value for fixed local random-
ness Wλ,µ. One has that (see [24])
Wλ,µ ≤ |~Tµ0 × ~Tµ1 | ≤ sin θµ (A9)
For maximally anti-commuting measurements, we get
Wλ,µ = 1. Combining (A8) and (A9), we get
pgλ,µ ≤
1
2
1 +
√√√√1 +√1−W 2λ,µ
2
 ≡ f(Wλ,µ).(A10)
We note that the function f is concave and decreasing.
Next, we establish the following convexity property of
the witness (in a slight abuse of notation, W denotes the
observed value of the witness when λ, µ are not known)
W ≤
∑
λ,µ
qλrµWλ,µ. (A11)
7To see that this holds, consider the entries of the matrix
defining W . They are of the form p(1|x, y) − p(1|x′, y).
When the devices have internal randomness, we can write
p(1|x, y)− p(1|x′, y) =
∑
λ,µ
qλrµ
(
Tr[ρλxΠ
µ
1|y]− Tr[ρλx′Πµ1|y]
)
=
∑
λ,µ
qλrµ~S
λ
xx′ · ~Tµy
=
(∑
λ
qλ~S
λ
xx′
)
·
(∑
µ
rµ ~T
µ
y
)
≡ ~Sxx′ · ~Ty, (A12)
where ρλx are the states produced by Alice’s box, and
Πµ1|y = (1 + M
µ
y )/2 are the projection operators of Bob
corresponding to outcome 1, ~Tµy is the Bloch vector cor-
responding to Mµy and S
λ
xx′ is the difference of the Bloch
vectors for ρλx and ρ
λ
x′ (see [24]). Now, from [24] it follows
that
W = (S01 × S23) · (T0 × T1) (A13)
=
∑
λ,λ′,µ,µ′
qλqλ′rµrµ′(S
λ
01 × Sλ
′
23) · (Tµ0 × Tµ
′
1 ) (A14)
=
∑
λ,λ′,µ,µ′
qλqλ′rµrµ′ |Sλ01 × Sλ
′
23||Tµ0 × Tµ
′
1 | cosφλ,λ′,µ,µ′
(A15)
where φλ,λ′,µ,µ′ denotes the angle between the vectors
(Sλ01 × Sλ
′
23) and (T
µ
0 × Tµ
′
1 ). Next we notice that, for
fixed λ, µ, µ′, there will be a value of λ′ such that |Sλ01 ×
Sλ
′
23| cosφλ,λ′,µ,µ′ is maximal. If we label this value λ
and set qλ′ = 1 when λ
′ = λ this can only increase the
expression. We thus obtain:
W ≤
∑
λ,µ,µ′
qλrµrµ′ |Sλ01 × Sλ23||Tµ0 × Tµ
′
1 | cosφλ,µ,µ′
(A16)
Using a similar argument, we can eliminate µ′:
W ≤
∑
λ,µ
qλrµ|Sλ01 × Sλ23||Tµ0 × Tµ1 | cosφλ,µ (A17)
=
∑
λ,µ
qλrµWλ,µ. (A18)
We are now ready to bound the guessing probability pg.
Using the definition of pg, (A10), and (A11) we have
pg =
∑
λ,µ
qλrµp
g
λ,µ (A19)
≤
∑
λ,µ
qλrµf(Wλ,µ) (A20)
≤ f(
∑
λ,µ
qλrµWλ,µ) (A21)
≤ f(W ) (A22)
where in the third line we have used Jensen’s inequality
and concavity of f , and in the last line we have used that
f is decreasing. Hence, we finally get
pg ≤ 1
2
1 +
√
1 +
√
1−W 2
2
 (A23)
which gives the desired upper bound on the guessing
probability as a function of the observed value of the wit-
ness W . This bound is tight when maximal violation of
the witness is achieved, i.e. W = 1. In Sec. D, we provide
the calculation for the maximum number of extractable
random bits.
Finally, we provide a proof of the relation between W
and the commutativity of the measurements. We write
Mµy = ~T
µ
y · ~σ, and we have∫
dµr(µ)|| [Mµ0 ,Mµ1 ] || =
∫
dµr(µ)||
[
~Tµ0 · ~σ, ~Tµ1 · ~σ
]
||
=
∫
dµr(µ)||2i(~Tµ0 × ~Tµ1 ) · ~σ||
= 2
∫
dµr(µ)|~Tµ0 × ~Tµ1 |
≥ 2
∫
dλdµq(λ)r(µ)Wλ,µ
≥ 2W, (A24)
where we have used (A9) and (A11).
Appendix B: Certifying randomness in the presence
of afterpulsing
In the following we show that although afterpulsing a
priory violates the i.i.d. assumption (iii), the self-testing
nature of our protocol captures the effect. When after-
pulsing is present, the witness value is reduced corre-
spondingly and randomness can still be certified.
To see this, we first consider a hypothetical experi-
ment in which the outputs are generated as follows: in
a fraction η of events, the experiment follows and ideal
quantum qubit implementation while for the remaining
events an outcome is generated at random by the mea-
surement device, determined only by some internal ran-
dom variable µ independent of the inputs. Let us denote
the witness value computed from the whole dataset W ,
and the value which would be obtained from only the
quantum events W˜ . To an observer who does not know
µ, the non-quantum events look just like uniform noise
and the witness values fulfil W = η2W˜ [24]. At the same
time, this scenario meets all of the assumptions in the
proof of randomness of Sec. A. Therefore, for an observer
with perfect knowledge of µ, who can hence perfectly pre-
dict the output for the non-quantum events, the guessing
probability on the whole dataset is bounded by
pg ≤ f(W ) = f(η2W˜ ). (B1)
8We now show that the witness value is reduced in a sim-
ilar way for afterpulsing, and hence even if the outputs
from afterpulsing events can be perfectly predicted, our
bound on the randomness still holds.
Consider an experiment generating a set S =
{(b1, x1, y1), . . . , (bN , xN , yN )} of N events. The first
thing to notice is that afterpulsing is probabilistic: in
any given event either there is an afterpulse or there is
not. We can therefore think of S as consisting of a set S˜
of N˜ events with no afterpulse and N − N˜ additional af-
terpulsing events. Let Nbxy denote the number of events
in S with outcome b and inputs x, y, and N˜bxy the events
in S˜, and define Nxy, N˜xy similarly. For simplicity let us
consider the limit of large N such that finite size effects
can be neglected. Since the inputs are chosen uniformly
Nxy = N/8. We note that the probability for an af-
terpulse to occur in a given round i of the experiment
does not depend on the inputs xi, yi in that round. The
number of afterpulses is therefore the same for all com-
binations of x,y, and N˜xy = ηN/8 with η = N˜/N . In
any afterpulsing event, the outcome bi is also uncorre-
lated to the inputs xi, yi in that round (since bi = bi−1).
This means that the effect of afterpulsing when counting
events can be written
Nb,x,y = N˜b,x,y + cb, (B2)
where, importantly, cb is independent of x (also of y and
indeed it may be independent of b, but this is not impor-
tant in the following).
The witness value on the dataset S is computed from
the frequencies νb|xy = Nb,x,y/Nx,y. Using the above, we
can write
νb|xy =
N˜b,x,y + cb
N/8
=
ηN˜b,x,y
ηN/8
+
8cb
N
= ην˜b|xy +
8cb
N
,
(B3)
where ν˜b|xy = N˜b,x,y/N˜x,y is the frequency one would
have obtained considering only the set S˜. Now, since the
last term above is independent of x and since the witness
is computed solely from terms of the form ν1|xy − ν1|x′y,
we have that
W = η2W˜ , (B4)
where W˜ is the witness value which one would obtain
from the events S˜ without afterpulsing. Since the re-
duction in W when afterpulses are added is exactly the
same as in the scenario above where events with perfectly
predictable outputs were added, it follows that even if af-
terpulse events would be perfectly predictable, the bound
(B1) on the guessing probability still holds.
Appendix C: Accounting for multi-photon events
For real-world sources it is challenging to guarantee
that they are of qubit nature. In particular, single-
photon sources based on spontaneous parametric down
conversion process or weak coherent sources have non-
zero probability of emitting more than one photon, vio-
lating the qubit assumption.
Given an imperfect source which does not always sat-
isfy the qubit assumption, we would like to say something
about the witness violation corresponding to events that
do satisfy the assumption. In particular, we would like a
lower bound on this violation in terms of the observed,
experimental probability distribution and some guaran-
tee on the fraction of non-qubit events. Even without a
detailed model of the source, it is possible to determine
this fraction e.g. using knowledge of the photon statistics.
1. Bounding the violation for given qubit fraction
To derive a bound on the quantum violation, we will
assume that each experimental round either satisfies the
qubit assumption, or not. That is, the conditional prob-
ability distribution for the experiment can be modeled
as
p(b|xz) = αpqa(b|xz) + (1− α)pq¯a(b|xz), (C1)
where α is the fraction of qubit events, pqa is the distri-
bution corresponding to the qubit events, and pq¯a is an
unrestricted distribution. The witness value is given in
terms of the probabilities by |W |, where
W =
∣∣∣∣p(1|0, 0)− p(1|1, 0) p(1|2, 0)− p(1|3, 0)p(1|0, 1)− p(1|1, 1) p(1|2, 1)− p(1|3, 1)
∣∣∣∣ . (C2)
From the model (C1), it follows that the expected witness
value must satisfy
W = |α2Wqa + (1− α)2Wq¯a + α(1− α)(G+G′)|, (C3)
where Wqa, Wq¯a are the determinants corresponding to
distributions pqa and pq¯a respectively, and
G =
∣∣∣∣pqa(1|0, 0)− pqa(1|1, 0) pqa(1|2, 0)− pqa(1|3, 0)pq¯a(1|0, 1)− pq¯a(1|1, 1) pq¯a(1|2, 1)− pq¯a(1|3, 1)
∣∣∣∣
G′ =
∣∣∣∣pq¯a(1|0, 0)− pq¯a(1|1, 0) pq¯a(1|2, 0)− pq¯a(1|3, 0)pqa(1|0, 1)− pqa(1|1, 1) pqa(1|2, 1)− pqa(1|3, 1)
∣∣∣∣
To bound the qubit violation for a given expected ob-
served violation we should minimise |Wqa| subject to the
constraint (C3). However, if a certain value W can be at-
tained for a fixed value of |Wqa|, then attaining all smaller
values requires even less qubit violation. We may there-
fore just as well look for the maximal W for fixed |Wqa|.
Any value above this maximum guarantees a qubit viola-
tion of at least |Wqa|. The maximum has a simple form.
It is given by
maxW = max
{
4α(1− α) + α(2α− 1)Wqa
2(1− α) + αWqa
}
. (C4)
9The first thing we notice is that when maxW in (C4) is
less than 1, it is always given by the first line. This is the
relevant case for certifying randomness in practice. Solv-
ing for the qubit violation, given an observed violation
less than unity we have the bound
Wqa ≥ 1
α(2α− 1) [W − 4α(1− α)]. (C5)
Second, we note that for α > 1/2 the maximum (C4) is
always larger than 1. This means that to be able to cer-
tify randomness in practice, we need a minimal fraction
of events satisfying the qubit assumption of
α >
1
2
. (C6)
Third, for a given value of α there is a minimal observed
violation below which the bound (C5) becomes trivial
and no randomness can be certified. We must have
W > 4α(1− α). (C7)
2. Estimating the qubit fraction
For an implementation with a particular source, we
need an estimate or a lower bound on the fraction of qubit
events α. Source and detector inefficiency, and transmis-
sion losses lead to inconclusive events, and our estimate
of α should be consistent with how these events are dealt
with.
In the scenario of non-malicious, error-prone devices
considered here, it is rather natural to discard inconclu-
sive events (e.g. assuming fair-sampling) and then com-
pute W from the remaining data. To be able to evaluate
(C5) in this case, one needs to estimate α when incon-
clusive events are discarded. It is also natural to assume
that all events with at most one photon emitted obey the
qubit assumption.
With these assumptions, let q denote the probability
for the source to emit at most one photon and consider an
experiment with N events and M conclusive events. Be-
fore post-selection, asymptotically the fraction of events
that obey the qubit assumption is then α = q. For a
finite number of events, we can put a conservative esti-
mate, i.e., a lower bound, on the number of events Nα
that satisfy the qubit assumption, within a given confi-
dence. In particular, under the assumption that we know
q, the behaviour of the source is modelled by a family
of N Bernoulli trials parameterized by q, and thus the
estimation problem can be solved by using the Chernoff-
Hoeffding tail inequality. More formally, let ν > 0 be the
failure probability of the estimation process and t > 0 be
the margin parameter, then
P (Nα ≤ qN − t) ≤ exp(−2Nt2) = ν, (C8)
which implies that Nα > qN − t is true with probability
at least 1− ν. Equivalently, the fraction of qubit events
without post-selection is α > q− t/N with probability at
least 1− ν. The margin parameter t can be expressed in
terms of N and ν as t =
√
1/(2N) log(1/ν).
To account for post-selection, we conservatively as-
sume that all multi-photon events are conclusive.
Asymptotically, the fraction of non-qubit events will be
(1 − q)N/M , so α = 1 − (1 − q)N/M . For finite N we
have that after post-selection
α ≥ 1− (1− q)N
M
− t
M
(C9)
with probability at least 1 − ν, with ν and t given by
(C8).
Appendix D: Security Analysis
In this section, we show that with the observed ex-
perimental statistics, it is possible to provide a bound
on the number of random bits that can be extracted
from the raw data set, Z, which takes values from a set
of all binary strings, Z of length m. Our approach es-
sentially uses the (quantum) leftover hash lemma, which
states that the amount of private randomness is approx-
imately equal to the min-entropy characterization of the
raw data Z. More specifically, it says that the number
of extractable random bits (that is independent of vari-
ables X,Y, L) is roughly given by Hmin(Z|XY L). Here,
we recall that variables X and Y are the inputs of Alice
and Bob, respectively, and L is the classical register cap-
turing all information about the local variables λ and µ.
The min-entropy of Z given XY L has a clear operational
meaning when casted in terms of the guessing probabil-
ity, i.e., Hmin(Z|XY L) = −m log2 pguess: it measures the
probability of correctly guessing Z when given access to
classical side-information XY L.
On a more concrete level, the leftover hash lemma em-
ploys a family of universal hash functions to convert Z
into an output string S (of size `) that is close to a
uniform string conditioned on side-information XY L. In
particular, we say that the output string S is ∆-close to
uniform conditioned on XY L, if
1
2
∑
s,x,y,l
|PSXY L − USPXY L| ≤ ∆, (D1)
where US is the uniform distribution of S. The quality
of the output string is directly related to the number of
extractable random bits, i.e.,
` =
⌊
Hmin(Z|XY L)− 2 log2
1
2∆
⌋
. (D2)
Therefore, to bound `, we only need to fix a security level
sec ≥ ∆ and find a lower bound on the min-entropy term.
Using the definition of conditional min-entropy and the
assumption that Z is generated from an iid process, we
10
have
` =
m−m log2
1 +
√
1 +
√
1−W 2
2
− 2 log2 12∆
 .
(D3)
Accordingly, the rate of extraction is `/m, and it con-
verges to the min-entropy rate when m → ∞ (therefore
∆ → 0). At the moment, our bound on ` is written in
terms of the expected value of W , which is not directly
accessible in the experiment. In order to relate the W
to the set of experimental statistics E := {n+x,y/nx,y}x,y,
we first use the Chernoff-Hoeffding tail inequality [35],
which provides an upper bound on the probability that
the sum of random variables deviates from its expected
value. We get
p(1|x, y)− t(pe, nx,y)
pe≤ n
+
x,y
nx,y
pe≤ p(1|xy) + t(pe, nx,y),
(D4)
where t(pe, nx,y) :=
√
log(1/pe)/(2nx,y). Here, re-
lations with oversetting pe means that the relations
are probabilistically true, i.e., the relations hold except
with probability pe. For our purposes later, we denote
p±x,y := p(1|x, y)± t(pe, nxy). In the following, we intro-
duce an estimate of the expected W , i.e.,
W
′≥Wmin := min
qx,y∈(p−x,y,p+x,y)
|W ({qx,y})| , (D5)
where ′ = 8pe and
W ({qx,y}) := det
[
q0,0 − q1,0 q2,0 − q3,0
q0,1 − q1,1 q2,1 − q3,1
]
. (D6)
Next, we need to bound the maximum fraction of non
qubit events, 1 − α. Following the discussion in Sec. C,
with post-selection we expect α to be 1− p2p1+p2 (p2 and p1
are the probabilities of the SPDC to emit, respectively,
a double pair or a single-photon pair). In the scenario
where N preparations are made, by using the Chernoff-
Hoedffing tail inequality, we have that
α
′′≥ αˆ := 1−
[
p2
p1 + p2
+ t(′′, N)
]
. (D7)
Plugging this into Eq. (C5), we get
Wqa
′+′′≥ Wmin − 4αˆ(1− αˆ)
αˆ(2αˆ− 1) . (D8)
Therefore, the effective violation is
Wˆeff :=
Wmin − 4αˆ(1− αˆ)
2αˆ− 1 . (D9)
Note that the effective violation is obtained by fixing the
violation due to non qubit contribution to be zero. In
FIG. 4. (a) NIST tests of the data at the output of the ex-
tractor. (b) Binary image (500×500) of the extracted random
bits.
other words, the effective violation measures the amount
of randomness in Z. That is, we have
` =
m−m log2
1 +
√√√√1 +√1− Wˆ 2eff
2
− 2 log2 12∆
 .
Finally, by choosing ∆ =  and fixing pe = 
′′ = , the
output string S is 10-close to uniform conditioned on
XY L. In the actual implementation we chose  = 10−3.
Appendix E: Output data analysis
We performed tests for assessing the quality of the gen-
erated randomness, looking for patterns and correlations
in the output data. We performed standard statistical
test, as defined by NIST. For each test, the p-value is the
result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and must satisfy
0.01 ≤ p ≤ 0.99 to be considered successful. Although
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Measurement
D/A R/L
D1 D2 D1 D2
P
re
p
a
ra
ti
o
n D
5903 97 3515 2485
A 172 5828 2950 3050
R 2825 3175 5914 86
L 3565 2435 199 5801
TABLE I. Sample of raw data taken during one minute under
good alignment conditions.
not all tests could be performed due to the small size
of the sample, all performed tests were successful (see
FIG. 4-(a)). A more visual approach to detecting pat-
terns is illustrated in FIG. 4-(b), where we display 250000
bits in a 500×500 matrix as a black-and-white image.
Any repeated pattern or regular structure in the image
would indicate correlations among the bits. No pattern
appears.
Appendix F: Example of raw data
Here, for completeness, we present an extract of the
raw data from our experiment, see Tab. I. The data cor-
responds to one minute of integration, under good align-
ment conditions. We give the detector counts observed
for each detector (D1 and D2), for each measurement
setting y and preparation setting x. As mentioned in the
main text, the preparations x = {0, 1, 2, 3} correspond
respectively to the diagonal (D), anti-diagonal (A), cir-
cular right (R) and circular left (L) polarization states.
The measurements y = {0, 1} correspond respectively to
the {D,A} basis and the {R,L} basis. In other words,
we use the preparations and measurements of the BB84
protocol.
Based on the raw data, we evaluate the asymptotic
probability distribution p(b|x, y) using the method pre-
sented in Section IV, and then evaluate the witness value
W . While perfect BB84 preparations and measurements
would give W = 1 in the asymptotic limit, the observed
value is reduced. This is partly due to alignment errors,
but especially to finite-size effects. To illustrate, we com-
pute the W value corresponding to the data in Tab. I
with and without accounting for finite-size effects. We
find W = 0.92 and W = 0.79 respectively. These val-
ues correspond to visibilities of V =
√
W ≈ 0.96 and
V ≈ 0.89 respectively, with respect to the ideal BB84
preparations and measurements mixed with white noise.
Note that W = 0.79 is not far from the average W = 0.76
observed under good conditions (see the main text).
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